The Mask | |
Other Names | Mask, The Mask, Ugly Face, Careto |
Location | Spain |
Date of initial activity | 2007 |
Suspected attribution | Spanish state-sponsored espionage group |
Government Affiliation | Spain |
Motivation | Cyber Espionage |
Associated tools | Trojan.Win32/Win64.Careto, |
Software | Windows, MacOS |
Systems targeted | Mac OS X and Linux versions and possibly versions for Android and iPad/iPhone (iOS). |
Active | Yes |
Overview
Careto / “The Mask” is an exceptionally sophisticated and elusive advanced persistent threat (APT) group that has been conducting cyber-espionage operations since at least 2007. This group is distinguished by its highly complex and versatile toolset, which includes advanced malware capable of infecting multiple operating systems such as Windows, Mac OS X, Linux, and potentially mobile platforms like Android and iOS. Their malware suite includes rootkits, bootkits, and exploits that enable stealth and persistence on infected systems, making Careto one of the most advanced APTs discovered to date.
The group targets a diverse range of high-profile entities, including government institutions, diplomatic offices, energy companies, research institutions, private equity firms, and activists. Careto’s operations span over 31 countries, underscoring their global reach and ambition. The malware intercepts all communication channels on infected systems, collecting vital information such as encryption keys, VPN configurations, and sensitive documents. The attackers can upload additional modules to perform a variety of malicious tasks, further enhancing their espionage capabilities.
Careto employs a high degree of operational security and professionalism. Their tactics include customized exploits against older Kaspersky Lab products to avoid detection, and the use of social engineering techniques such as spear-phishing emails with malicious links. The group’s operational procedures demonstrate a sophisticated approach to cybersecurity threats, including monitoring their infrastructure, shutting down operations to evade detection, and employing data-wiping techniques to erase log files. These factors, combined with the strategic nature of their targets and the advanced technical capabilities of their toolset, strongly suggest that Careto could be a state-sponsored threat actor.
Common targets
Countries: Morocco, France, Libya, Venezuela, Poland, Brazil, Spain, United States, South Africa, Tunisia, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Iran, Germany
Industries: Government institutions, Diplomatic offices and embassies, Energy, oil and gas companies, Research institutions, Private equity firms, Activists
Attack Vectors
Spear-phishing e-mails with links to a malicious website, Vulnerabilities, social engineering
How they operate
Careto, also known as “The Mask,” represents one of the most sophisticated threat actors in the realm of cyber-espionage. Active since at least 2007, The Mask employs an intricate and diverse toolkit designed to infiltrate and extract sensitive information from targeted systems. This advanced persistent threat (APT) is notable not only for its technical complexity but also for its meticulous operational procedures, which strongly suggest state sponsorship.
The infection process of The Mask begins with spear-phishing emails containing links to malicious websites. These emails are tailored to deceive recipients, redirecting them to exploit-laden pages that cater to the specific configurations of their systems. Upon successful exploitation, the malware redirects the user to a legitimate website, such as a YouTube video or a news portal, to avoid suspicion. This strategic approach ensures that the initial infection goes largely unnoticed, allowing the malware to establish a foothold on the target machine.
Once inside a system, The Mask deploys a variety of tools, including rootkits and bootkits, which enable it to maintain a low profile and evade detection. These tools intercept all communication channels, allowing the malware to collect critical data such as encryption keys, VPN configurations, SSH keys, and RDP files. The operators can further enhance their control by uploading additional modules to perform specific malicious tasks. This modularity not only increases the versatility of The Mask but also complicates efforts to identify and remove the threat.
The Mask’s reach extends beyond Windows systems; it includes versions for Mac OS X and Linux, with indications of potential backdoors for Android and iOS devices. This cross-platform capability is achieved through a combination of exploits and social engineering techniques, such as prompting users to download fake Java updates or install malicious browser plugins. One of the notable exploits used by The Mask is the Adobe Flash Player vulnerability (CVE-2012-0773), which was originally leveraged by the VUPEN team to break the Chrome sandbox during the 2012 CanSecWest Pwn2Own contest. The Mask’s acquisition and use of such sophisticated exploits underscore its advanced capabilities and access to high-level resources.
The Mask’s command-and-control (C&C) infrastructure is equally sophisticated, employing numerous techniques to avoid detection and maintain operational security. The attackers monitor their infrastructure closely, shutting down operations and wiping log files to prevent forensic analysis. Although the known C&C servers were taken offline in January 2014, the possibility of the campaign being resurrected in the future cannot be ruled out.