Researchers from the University of the West Indies have uncovered a vulnerability in WPA3, the latest Wi-Fi security protocol designed to improve upon WPA2. The researchers, including Kyle Chadee, Wayne Goodridge, and Koffka Khan, demonstrated how WPA3’s transition mode, which enables compatibility with WPA2 devices, can be exploited to bypass the protocol’s protections. Their study shows how a combination of Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks and social engineering can allow attackers to recover network passwords.
The attack begins with a downgrade exploit, where attackers capture part of the WPA3 handshake. They then use social engineering to prompt unsuspecting users into entering their Wi-Fi credentials. By deauthenticating users from the original WPA3 network and creating an “evil twin” access point, attackers deceive users into connecting to a fake network. This access point is equipped with a captive portal that asks for the Wi-Fi password, which is then verified against the captured handshake.
The researchers used tools such as Airgeddon and a Raspberry Pi to simulate the WPA3 access point and initiate the attack. Their findings are particularly concerning as they reveal that the attack was successful when Protected Management Frames (PMF) were not implemented. Many users are unaware of the importance of enabling PMF, which is crucial to preventing such attacks. The study also noted that some devices failed to connect to WPA3 transition networks, calling into question the protocol’s true backward compatibility with WPA2, as claimed by the Wi-Fi Alliance.
This research highlights the ongoing challenges in securing wireless networks, even with advanced protocols like WPA3. Experts are urging for further investigation into WPA3’s vulnerabilities and stronger safeguards to protect against these kinds of attacks. As WPA3 adoption grows, it is crucial for both users and manufacturers to ensure proper configuration and educate users about potential threats to maintain the security and integrity of Wi-Fi networks.
Reference:
