Smartphones were once notoriously insecure despite the sheer amount of personal information they stored. Thankfully, that situation has improved, but this enhanced security faces constant challenges from companies like Cellebrite, which develop tools for law enforcement to bypass protections on various mobile devices. While Cellebrite keeps its exact methods and capabilities private, an individual who goes by the handle rogueFed recently accessed a confidential Cellebrite briefing. They emerged with a critical list detailing which of Google’s Pixel phones are vulnerable to the company’s data extraction technology.
RogueFed quickly shared screenshots from the recent Microsoft Teams meeting on the GrapheneOS forums, where they were spotted by 404 Media. GrapheneOS is an alternative, security-focused operating system based on Android, often installed on Pixel phones. It is known for its significantly enhanced security features and the complete absence of Google services. Since GrapheneOS is popular among those highly conscious of their privacy and security, Cellebrite apparently found it necessary to include the operating system in its matrix of supported Pixel devices, making its security capabilities part of the leaked vulnerability data.
The circulated screenshot provides data on several generations of Google phones, specifically covering the Pixel 6, Pixel 7, Pixel 8, and Pixel 9 families. It notably does not include any information on the more recently released Pixel 10 series. Crucially, the level of vulnerability is categorized based on the phone’s current operational state, splitting support into three conditions: before first unlock (BFU), after first unlock (AFU), and unlocked.
The Before First Unlock (BFU) state is traditionally considered the most secure because the phone has just been restarted and all user data remains fully encrypted. In this state, data extraction is most difficult. Once the device has been unlocked at least once since the restart, it transitions to the After First Unlock (AFU) state, which makes data extraction considerably easier for tools like Cellebrite’s.
Unsurprisingly, an unlocked phone presents the least resistance, essentially leaving personal data completely exposed for easy acquisition. This leaked matrix provides valuable, actionable insight for security researchers and users interested in understanding the practical limits of their device’s protection against advanced forensic tools.
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