Japan’s National Police Agency (NPA) and the National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NCSC) have linked a persistent cyberattack campaign targeting Japanese organizations, businesses, and individuals to a China-based threat actor known as MirrorFace. Active since 2019, the primary objective of these attacks is to steal critical information regarding Japan’s national security and advanced technology. The threat actor, also known as Earth Kasha, is considered a subgroup of the advanced persistent threat (APT) group APT10, which has a history of targeting Japanese entities.
The NPA and NCSC identified three primary campaigns orchestrated by MirrorFace. Campaign A, which ran from December 2019 to July 2023, targeted think tanks, government bodies, politicians, and media organizations. The attack leveraged spear-phishing emails to deliver various malware including LODEINFO, NOOPDOOR, and LilimRAT, a custom version of Lilith RAT. Campaign B, occurring between February and October 2023, focused on the semiconductor, manufacturing, communications, academic, and aerospace sectors, exploiting known vulnerabilities in internet-facing devices like Array Networks, Citrix, and Fortinet to install tools such as Cobalt Strike Beacon, LODEINFO, and NOOPDOOR.
The most recent wave of attacks, Campaign C, started in June 2024 and primarily targeted academia, think tanks, politicians, and media organizations with spear-phishing emails delivering ANEL (also known as UPPERCUT). MirrorFace employed various techniques to maintain a covert presence on compromised systems, including Visual Studio Code remote tunnels, which allowed attackers to bypass network defenses and remotely control infected machines. This method of establishing hidden connections made it difficult for security systems to detect the attackers’ activities.
Additionally, the NPA and NCSC revealed that MirrorFace attackers had used Windows Sandbox to execute malicious payloads without detection. By running malware within the sandbox, the attackers could bypass antivirus software and endpoint detection and response (EDR) systems. Once the host system was rebooted or shut down, traces of the malicious activity were erased, leaving no evidence behind. This approach made it harder for security personnel to track the attackers’ actions, complicating efforts to investigate and neutralize the threat.
