The Qilin ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation stands out as a highly active and formidable threat to organizations globally, frequently employing extortion as a core tactic. The group recently took responsibility for a September ransomware attack that severely hampered operations and manufacturing functions at Japanese brewing conglomerate, Asahi Group Holdings, for nearly two weeks. Investigators from Resecurity engaged directly with Qilin’s operators and learned the group is attempting to sell the stolen Asahi data for a significant ransom of $10 million USD. This direct demand, received shortly after the disruption, likely serves as a tactic to bypass intermediaries and intensify the pressure on the victim organization.
Qilin continues to rapidly expand its list of compromised organizations. The group announced several new targets on October 15, including the Spanish Tax Administration Agency (Agencia Tributaria), various U.S.-based entities like Centurion Family Office Services LLC and Richmond Behavioral Health Authority (RBHA), and international companies such as Turnkey Africa and municipal bodies in France. This followed previous claims on October 14 against major victims like Volkswagen Group France, a subsidiary of Volkswagen AG. The increasing focus on the automotive industry is particularly notable, possibly inspired by the lucrative consequences of prior incidents like the data breach involving Jaguar Land Rover (JLR), or achieved through collaboration with initial access brokers (IAB) offering compromised network access on the Dark Web.
The month of October has proven to be extremely successful for Qilin, marked by a high volume of published victims and newly targeted organizations across the globe. This period demonstrates a clear and increasing focus on the United States, with attacks hitting local municipalities such as the City of Riviera Beach, Florida, and Cobb County. Overall, the group has disclosed compromising over 50 new victims spanning a wide range of market verticals and diverse geographies, including Croatia, France, Germany, South Korea, and Qatar, showcasing its transnational reach.
A critical component of the Qilin RaaS operation is its deep ties to underground bulletproof hosting (BPH) operators. These specialized providers allow cybercriminals to host their illicit content and critical infrastructure, such as command-and-control servers and data storage, in a clandestine manner that evades easy disruption by law enforcement. Since its emergence, Qilin has habitually relied on these file-sharing hosts, often situated in complex legal jurisdictions, to store the vast amounts of data stolen from its victims. The anonymity and jurisdictional challenges offered by BPH are central to the group’s ability to operate with impunity.
The covert nature of BPH services presents a significant obstacle for both cybersecurity researchers and law enforcement agencies attempting to identify and dismantle the operators and their infrastructure. This complexity severely complicates efforts to combat Qilin’s cybercrime activities and protect users. While one BPH provider linked to Qilin recently executed an “exit scam” and went private within Dark Web communities, the associated legal entities in Russia and Hong Kong reportedly remain operational as of October 15, 2025. This interconnectedness with ransomware groups like Qilin confirms the highly organized, transnational nature of modern cybercrime, which expertly exploits jurisdictional discrepancies for financial gain and to conceal its activities.
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