A new vulnerability, known as DoubleClickjacking, has been disclosed by cybersecurity researcher Paulos Yibelo. This attack technique builds on the traditional clickjacking method but adds a timing-based element that exploits the gap between the first and second clicks in a double-click action. Unlike single-click attacks, which security measures like X-Frame-Options and SameSite cookies are designed to block, DoubleClickjacking bypasses these protections, posing a significant new risk for users on major websites. The vulnerability allows attackers to manipulate UI elements on web pages, potentially leading to account takeovers and other malicious activities.
The attack works by having a user visit an attacker-controlled website, which either opens a new browser window or tab, often mimicking something innocuous like a CAPTCHA verification. The user is then prompted to double-click to complete the step. During this double-click sequence, the parent site exploits the JavaScript Window Location object to stealthily redirect the user to a malicious page, such as an OAuth authorization page. At the same time, the attacker can close the original window, causing the user to unknowingly approve a harmful action, like granting access to a malicious application.
What makes DoubleClickjacking particularly concerning is that many web applications and frameworks are designed to defend against single-click risks but are not equipped to handle this timing-based variant. Common defenses like X-Frame-Options, SameSite cookies, and Content Security Policies (CSP) do not protect against this new attack method, making it an effective bypass. This vulnerability represents a significant shift in the way attackers can exploit web applications, opening the door to previously unaddressed security risks.
To mitigate DoubleClickjacking, website owners are advised to take client-side actions, such as disabling critical buttons by default until a mouse gesture or key press is detected. Services like Dropbox have already implemented such preventative measures. For long-term defense, it is recommended that browser vendors adopt new standards similar to X-Frame-Options to defend against double-click exploitation. This vulnerability adds a new layer to the ongoing evolution of clickjacking attacks, further emphasizing the need for more robust, proactive security measures across the web.
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